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T
he Banque de France was founded in 1800 to discount bills and
issue currency.1 Initially, it was a private institution run by its stock-
holders. The Banque was nationalized in 1936 and its governing
council was staffed by officials with a mandate to represent various inter-
ests in society. The Banque’s autonomy was largely restored in 1973, and
the Banque became officially independent in 1994. Whereas the Banque
had originally lent appreciable sums to the Treasury, such lending was
scheduled to be eliminated beginning in 1993 as part of the move toward
monetary union.2 At that time the monetary policy operations of the
Banque were revised substantially. The Banque also operates as a com-
mercial bank, including taking deposits and holding an investment port-
folio, although such activities are secondary to its responsibilities as the
central bank. While secondary, these activities influence the composition
of the Banque de France’s assets, shown below.
The Banque’s final monetary policy objective was price stability, with
growth of a broad monetary aggregate and a stable exchange rate as inter-
mediate objectives. The Banque achieved its near-term interest rate objec-
tives through two types of repurchase agreement arrangements: the
seven-day repo and the five- to ten-day repo. The difference between the
demand for reserves and the Banque de France’s holdings of Treasury
bills was largely made up by twice-weekly seven-day repos, at a rate that
was usually the market floor.3 Bids were all serviced at the official rate, 
but that rate was not always announced, so the tenders could be equal to
or greater than the official rate. The repos were conducted with principal
market operators that tended to be larger and more sophisticated credit
institutions.4 The principal market operators transmitted bids for all other
participating credit institutions. The five- to ten-day repos were similar,
but they were offered under a standing facility at an elevated rate that34 Second Quarter 2002 New England Economic Review
was typically 75 to 150 basis points above the inter-
vention rate and generally acted as the market ceiling.
Because of the elevated rate, only a relatively small
volume of five- to ten-day repos were usually out-
standing. Following reforms to the French monetary
and financial system in the mid-1980s, the Banque de
France also engaged in fine-tuning operations in the
form of the sale or purchase of Treasury bills, in 24- to
48-hour repos or withdrawals of liquidity.5
Fine-tuning operations were conducted virtually
every day after 1992, for several reasons. First, in that
year the Banque significantly lowered reserve require-
ments, leaving required reserves closer to settlement
requirements and therefore reducing the ability of
banks to substitute reserves across days within the set-
tlement period.6 Second, capital mobility increased,
necessitating more frequent intervention to keep the
intervention rate near its target. And third, the deregu-




The Banque de France had the right to buy and
sell Treasury bills and all negotiable debt instruments
(certificates of deposit, bills issued by finance compa-
nies, commercial paper, medium-term notes). How-
ever, the market for such instruments needed to be of
sufficient depth, and, as of 1994, the Banque did not
operate in certificates of deposit or commercial paper;
at that time it only owned Treasury bills. Redis-
counting ceased in 1971 except for some preferential
financing procedures (such as for medium-term export
credits) that stopped in 1986.
Collateral for Advances (Repurchase Agreements)8
Lending to credit institutions took the form exclu-
sively of repurchase agreements against Treasury bills
and private paper—commercial paper or other credit
instruments. Private securities had to have an initial
maturity of less than two years and could only be
issued by companies that had received the Banque de
France’s most favorable credit rating (3 on a scale of 3
to 6). These private securities were referred to as
“mobilization certificates” and were issued by the bor-
rowing institution on behalf of the Banque de France;
the Banque retained the certificates until the expiration
of the repurchase agreement.
Monetary Reserves
The Banque de France also was the repository of
the monetary reserves in the form of gold and foreign
exchange. As of the mid-1990s, the Banque did not use
purchases and sales of these assets as instruments of
monetary policy. Nevertheless, these reserves consti-
tuted a significant percentage of its assets.
Recent Composition of Assets
At the end of 1997, the Banque de France had
assets equal to Fr 591.2 billion.9 Gold and international
reserves accounted for 57 percent of assets, with gold
alone accounting for 25 percent of assets. The largest
category of international reserves was foreign ex-
change assets and investments, which equaled 18 per-
cent of assets. Claims on the European Monetary
Institute equaled 10 percent of assets and claims on the
International Monetary Fund equaled 4 percent of
assets. Lending to credit institutions, exclusively in the
form of repurchase agreements, accounted for 21 per-
cent of assets. Treasury bills purchased to implement
monetary policy equaled 3 percent of assets. The largest
other categories were assets arising from commercial
banking activities (largely correspondent accounts), 7
percent; securities in the course of collection (primarily
checks delayed by strikes at year-end), 4 percent; and
claims on the Treasury other than securities purchased
to implement monetary policy, 3 percent.
Depository institutions appeared to have preferred
securing repurchase agreements with private rather
thanpublicsecurities. 10 OftheFr125billioninsecurities
obtained through repurchase agreements owned by the
Banque de France at the end of 1997, Fr 80 billion (64
percent) were secured by private claims. Fr 40 billion
(32 percent) were secured by government securities,
and Fr 5 billion were secured by other securities.
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